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Silent or Salient? Ability Heterogeneity in Tournaments
Abstract
I experimentally investigate the impact of the level and salience of the ability heterogeneity on the
effectiveness of relative performance information (RPI) on individual performance in tournaments.
In my setting, the first stage is used to sort out the task abilities while the second stage consists of
a tournament. My primary dependent variable is the effectiveness of the RPI provided at the end
of the first stage, captured by the change of individual performance over the stages. Consistent
with my predictions, I find that RPI’s effectiveness is more positive when the ability heterogeneity
is low and salient than when it is high and salient, because the knowledge of ability heterogeneity
influences participants’ performance expectations. I also find that RPI’s effectiveness is more
positive when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient than when it is not salient, because both
high and low performers attach greater value to the tournament outcomes in the former situation.
Moreover, I find that RPI’s effectiveness is not more negative when the ability heterogeneity is
high and salient than when it is not salient, as unequal competitions might give rise to additional
value in winning the tournament. Finally, I find that performance reduction in low performers is
smaller than that in high performers, once the ability heterogeneity become salient and low. My
results suggest that when RPI is present, its effectiveness depends on the ability heterogeneity and
its saliency that firms should consider when designing effective tournaments.
Keywords: heterogeneity; salience of information; relative performance information; tournament

1. Introduction
This study investigates how the level and salience of employee heterogeneity affects the
effectiveness of relative performance information (RPI) in tournaments. Firms commonly use
tournaments to motivate employees (Berger, Libby, and Webb 2018; Chen, Williamson, and Zhou
2012; Hazels and Sasse 2008; Kwoh 2012). In tournament settings, employees often receive
feedback about their relative performance (Nordstrom, Lorenzi, and Hall 1990; Gino and Staats
2011; Gill, Kissova, Lee, and Prowse 2018). As accountants play a major role in providing
information and feedback to employees (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Hannan, McPhee, Newman,
and Tafkov 2013), it is important for accountants to understand conditions where the effectiveness
of RPI (i.e., positive effect of RPI on task performance) varies.
Firms such as General Electric, Yahoo!, and Whirlpool are continuously experimenting
with different forms of relative-performance feedback (Kuhnen and Tymula 2012). This
experimenting may be the result of a lack of consensus about the effectiveness of RPI in the
workplace (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Grote 2005; Hazels and Sasse 2008). The extant literature has
yielded mixed evidence on the effectiveness of RPI in tournaments. For example, Eriksson,
Poulsen, and Villeval (2009) find that RPI induces higher performance in all employees. Kuhnen
and Tymula (2012), however, provide evidence that top performers shirk with RPI and Fershtsman
and Gneezy (2011) report lower performance as quitting becomes more common with RPI.
Delfgaauw, Dur, Non, and Verbeke (2014) find no overall effect of RPI as the high performers
improve performance while the low performers do not respond to tournament incentives. The
inconclusive findings might be related to performance levels which vary across a continuum
(Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003). More so, the mixed evidence might be attributable to
employees’ perceptions of ability heterogeneity, which could depend on the feedback that makes
1

the perceptions more salient. To the extent that such perceptions are important to the responses to
feedback (Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman 2011; Gill et al. 2018; Perez-Truglia 2019), the
impact of RPI on performance might be contingent on whether the knowledge of ability
heterogeneity is salient and the level of ability heterogeneity.
In management accounting, Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman (2008) find that RPI may
weaken mean performance under tournament contracts. Hannan et al. argue that employees who
are lagging in performance learn from a series of precise RPI that winning is unlikely and as a
result work less efficiently. However, depending on the level, and salience of employee
heterogeneity, RPI may influence employees differentially. Specifically, when the actual level of
employee heterogeneity is uncertain, the high performers might attribute their relative standing to
perceived higher abilities while the low performers might attribute their relative standing to a belief
that they put forth lower effort. As they receive more updates on RPI, perceived distribution of
task ability might become salient and heterogeneous (Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez 2009; Ederer
2010). When the level of employee heterogeneity is high and salient, both high and low performers
are more likely to attribute their relative standing to the ability advantage or disadvantage, resulting
in effort reduction. When the level of employee heterogeneity is low and salient, performance is
more likely to be attributed to high or low effort level, resulting in equal or even higher effort and,
thus, performance.
In this paper’s setting, participants’ abilities are sorted out before they compete in a
tournament that determines the winner. The setting is generalizable to the real world as firms often
sort employees based on their abilities during hiring and promotion processes (Lise, Meghir, and
Robin 2016; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). When the ability heterogeneity is salient, I argue that a
low level of ability heterogeneity likely homogenizes tournament participants’ performance
2

expectations and might augment the non-pecuniary value of rank by intensifying social
comparison (Festinger 1954; Kulik and Ambrose 1992). Hence, I predict that when RPI is present
task performance is highest when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient but is lowest when it
is high and salient.
When the ability heterogeneity is not salient, I argue that participants are more uncertain
about their tournament outcomes compared to when the ability heterogeneity is high and salient,
which encourages exerting more effort. Participants are also less likely in both of these conditions
to associate the same value to rank compared to when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient.
As such, I predict that when RPI is present, task performance is higher when the ability
heterogeneity is not salient compared to when it is high and salient, but lower compared to when
it is low and salient. In addition, I argue that while both high and low performers likely will
increase performance when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient, the self-serving attributions
will likely lead to a differential impact on performance between the two types of participants.
Therefore, I predict that when RPI is present, the drop in the performance change from when the
ability heterogeneity is low and salient to when it is not salient, is higher for high performers than
low performers.
To test my predictions, I collect data using a tournament setting in which the first stage of
the tournament is used to sort out the task abilities while the second stage determines the winners.
I adapt the task design from Chan (2018) which is an advanced slider task with both an ability part
that requires solving subtraction problems and an effort part that requires positioning sliders. I
manipulate the level and salience of ability heterogeneity using a between-participants design with
three conditions: Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous versus NotSalient. In Homogeneous and
Heterogeneous conditions, participants are made aware that they compete in the second stage with
3

peers of similar or different task ability based on RPI presented at the end of the first stage. In
NotSalient condition, participants are not informed about the task ability of the peers they compete
in the second stage relative to their own. I examine participants’ behavior before and after they
receive the RPI across the three conditions. My primary dependent variable, is the difference of
individual performance between the second and the first stage scaled by the first-stage performance,
which captures the effectiveness of RPI.
I find that RPI’s effectiveness is more positive in Homogeneous than Heterogeneous
condition, and the effect is driven by the knowledge of ability heterogeneity influencing
participants’ performance expectations and the achievement goal of the participants. Consistent
with my predictions, I also find that RPI’s effectiveness is more positive in Homogeneous than
NotSalient condition. Additional analysis confirms that low performers attached greater nonmonetary value to tournament outcomes in Homogeneous condition, and that perceived
heterogeneity drives the difference in RPI’s effectiveness between the conditions. Moreover, I find
that RPI’s effectiveness is not more negative in Heterogeneous than NotSalient condition.
Additional analysis confirms that while low performers in Heterogeneous condition are
demotivated due to low winning expectations, they’re also motivated by greater non-monetary
value of ranks. Finally, I find that the drop in RPI’s effectiveness from Homogeneous to NotSalient
condition is higher for high performers than low performers. The effect is driven by high
performers in NotSalient condition self-servingly attributing their relative performance to the
ability advantage while low performers equally attribute their relative performance to ability
disadvantage and insufficient effort.
Results of this study underscore the inter-related nature of tournament structure and
information system design choices and have important implications for the design of effective
4

tournaments. These results contribute to a stream of research that has only recently begun to
consider the role that tournament structure plays in determining the effect of RPI on performance
in tournaments (Freeman and Gelber 2010; Newman and Tafkov 2014). Particularly, the study
extends prior research (Newman and Tafkov 2014) that shows that the negative effect of providing
RPI in tournaments, as documented by Hannan et al (2008), is not universal to all tournament
structures. By showing that that the effectiveness of providing RPI varies based on the level and
salience of tournament participants’ ability heterogeneity, I highlight that firms should keep in
mind the structure of their tournaments when providing RPI. Specifically, my results suggest that
when RPI is present firms should provide information about the tournament structure in terms of
the level of ability heterogeneity from employees under a homogeneous tournament but may
withhold such knowledge under a heterogeneous tournament. Also, the results suggest that if RPI
is readily available via informal sources (Hannan et al. 2013), the effectiveness of tournaments
may be affected by perceived ability heterogeneity among the participants. However, it is not
necessarily the case that firms need to discontinue the tournaments to avoid negative performance
effects if the informal information suggests more homogeneous tournaments.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background
information and develops my hypotheses; Section 3 describes the experiment; Section 4 reports
the results; and Section 5 concludes the study.
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
2.1 Background
How individuals respond to RPI in tournaments is empirically inconclusive (Kluger and
Denisi 1996; Smither, London, and Reilly 2005). Even though it can encourage some to catch up
5

or to excel, others may be demotivated or become complacent. For example, in a lab experiment,
Eriksson et al. (2009) find that RPI induces higher performance in both high and low performers.
The perceptions of ability heterogeneity among the participants was not measured or manipulated
in their study, which might have contributed to the findings. In contrast, Fershtsman and Gneezy
(2011) report that RPI is associated with high performers reducing effort and a substantial portion
of low performers giving up. Although ability heterogeneity was manipulated in their field
experiment (similar to Homogeneous condition), the experiment was conducted with teenagers
competing in 60-meter races. The observed quitting behavior might be attributable to the subjects
not taking running ability seriously. Other studies find that high and low performers respond to
RPI in opposite directions. For instance, Hannan et al. (2008) find that high performers increase
performance while low performers work inefficiently, resulting in lower overall tournament
performance after receiving RPI. Similarly, in a field experiment involving several geographically
scattered sales teams, Delfgaauw et al. (2014) find no overall effect of RPI as the high performers
improve performance while the low performers do not respond to tournament incentives.
Relatedly, in non-tournament settings, the impact of RPI is also not as clear. A number of
papers find higher performance or greater effort with RPI (Gneezy and Rustichini 2004; Mas and
Moretti 2009; Freeman and Gelber 2010; Tafkov 2013; Azmat and Iriberri 2016; Bradler,
Neckermann, and Non 2016). However, some papers report lower performance (Bellemare et al.
2010; Barankay 2011, 2012; Bandiera et al. 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee 2014) or find no clear
pattern (Gino and Staats 2011; Bhattacharya and Dugar 2012; Rosaz, Slonim, and Villeval 2012;
Georganas, Tonin, and Vlassopoulos 2015). Most of these studies do not explicitly consider ability
heterogeneity as a possible factor in influencing how individuals respond to RPI. To this point in
the literature, the effects of ability heterogeneity on RPI’s effectiveness are largely unexplored.
6

Prior literature also provides some evidence suggesting high performers in tournaments
might be susceptible to complacency effect (Cardinaels, Chen, and Yin 2018). Cardinaels et al.
(2018) and Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) find that contestants tend to be complacent and
reduce their subsequent effort when RPI indicates they are in a leading position. Berger et al. (2013)
analyze repeated tournaments and find immediate complacency in the winners after the prize is
awarded. In a real corporate setting, Cai and Gallani (2018) also observe a similar complacency
effect in high performers. However, Muller and Schotter (2009) find that high performers are
motivated to work harder while learning their leading position. In high-skill settings where
participants are of high dispositional ability, non-complacency is more prevalent, but the evidence
is also mixed. Using data from NBA games, Berger and Pope (2011) find that leading in the first
half is associated with reduced effort. In professional golf tournaments, however, Guryan, Kroft,
and Notowidigdo (2009) find no effect of RPI on effort or performance. In addition to providing
mixed evidence of complacency in high performers, whether dispositional or situational, the
aforementioned studies also do not take into account the effects of ability heterogeneity.
2.2 Hypotheses
Ability heterogeneity refers to the difference in the task-related ability among tournament
participants. Within a tournament, task-related ability naturally varies across a continuum
(Hamilton et al. 2003), ranging from extreme homogeneity (or very low levels of ability
heterogeneity) to an extreme level of ability heterogeneity. Given ability heterogeneity will likely
shape tournament participants’ performance expectations (Abeler et al. 2011; Gill et al. 2018;
Perez-Truglia 2019), I predict the effectiveness of RPI will be contingent on the knowledge of
ability heterogeneity.
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Specifically, when the heterogeneity level is high and salient, winning is perceived ex ante
as more likely by the high performers and less likely by the low performers. This is because, ceteris
paribus, the level of task ability is positively associated with task performance, as studies in both
economics and psychology find that task abilities are stable and predict performance (Heckman,
Jagelka, and Kautz 2019). Employees are often effort-averse (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Lambert
2007). As a result, high performers will likely calibrate their effort level based on RPI such that
they can win the tournament without wasting costly effort. Realizing the ability disadvantage, low
performers perceive the tournament as an uphill battle and are thus inclined to save effort.
Therefore, making salient the high level of ability heterogeneity is likely to demotivate both high
and low performers from exerting effort, resulting in low performance. When the heterogeneity
level is low and salient, however, both winning and losing are perceived as equally likely by all
participants. Within each tournament group, then, they do not perceive themselves ex ante as either
high or low performers. As any differences in individual ability no longer drive the differences in
relative performance here, participants must rely on exerting effort to improve their ranks. Within
each tournament group, all the participants might perceive their positions under constant threat
from each other, and thus are more likely to maintain or increase than to decrease effort.
RPI influences tournament participants through two channels: 1) marginal pecuniary return
of effort, and 2) non-pecuniary value of rank (Gill et al. 2018). RPI facilitates social comparison
among the participants as it allows individuals to compare themselves to others (Tafkov 2013).
Prior accounting literature provides evidence that the motivational effect of social comparison
exists even when compensation is not tied to peer performance (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008). When
ability heterogeneity is low compared to when it is high, individuals are more likely to engage in
social comparison since the comparison target (i.e., the other person) is perceived as more similar
8

on task ability (Garcia and Tor 2007). The greater engagement in social comparison enhances
individual motivation to outperform others (Brown, Ferris, Heller, and Keeping 2007; Brown and
Gallagher 1992). Therefore, making salient that the competition is among peers of similar ability
can cause participants to attach greater non-pecuniary value to winning. Specifically, in a
tournament full of high performers, the participants attach greater nonmonetary value to winning
since winning among the top performers suggests a higher status than winning among performers
with a range of skill (Altmann, Falk, and Wibral 2012; Dohmen, Falk, Fliessbach, Sunde, and
Weber 2011; Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi 2007). In a tournament full of low performers, losing
brings additional nonmonetary loss of being identified as the worst in the organization. Prior
research suggests that being among the worst increases the participant’s need for proving otherwise
(Gill et al. 2018). Taken together, making salient the low level of ability heterogeneity might
encourage participants to increase effort, likely resulting in performance improvement. In sum, the
effectiveness of RPI is higher when participants are aware that they are competing with peers of
similar level of ability than with peers of different levels of ability.
H1: When ability heterogeneity is salient, RPI’s effectiveness is higher when the level
of ability heterogeneity is low compared to when it is high.
The effectiveness of RPI might also be affected by the salience of ability heterogeneity.
Individuals are poor information aggregators. They do not consider fully all the information
available to them, but rather over-emphasize the information on which their minds focus (Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012; Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010). In psychology, salience detection is a
key mechanism enabling humans to focus their limited cognitive resources on a relevant subset of
the available information (Taylor and Thompson 1982).

9

Firms often have an informational advantage about the ability heterogeneity of participants
in the tournament, especially when the performance difference is not directly observable, or when
the performance appraisal involves multiple skills or has some subjective element (Ederer and
Fehr 2017). Firms sometimes form and make known more homogeneous tournaments, in which
case, as previously discussed, RPI causes a stronger preference for rank. First, both internal and
external hiring and promotion processes are considered rank-order tournaments (Chan 1996).
When hiring or promoting talents from inside a company, the candidates have at least some
knowledge of each other’s ability (Waldman 1984; Greenwald 1986), ability heterogeneity is low
and salient. The inclusion of external candidates, in comparison, makes the heterogeneity less
salient and the tournaments intrinsically more heterogeneous (Bidwell 2011). Second, companies
sometimes segment a tournament by task ability. For example, tournament platforms such as
TopCoder divide the competitors into two competitor pools according to an ability level cutoff,
and make both individual ability and performance information available (Boudreau, Lakhani, and
Menietti 2016; Heite 2020). More generally, labor forces in reality are sorted into corporate
tournaments of different stakes based on ability (Lazear and Rosen 1981, fn. 5). By making salient
the level of ability heterogeneity and participant’s own ability the participants tend to react toward
such information.
Before a tournament starts, individuals likely form expectations of their chances of winning
based on the perceived standing of their ability relative to other participants. When the distribution
of ability in the tournaments is known, the expectations serve as a clear reference point in
determining their effort provision (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Abler et al. 2011).1 When the ability

1

In homogeneous (heterogeneous) tournaments, both high and low performers should expect that spending effort is
(not) worthwhile, compared to when the ability heterogeneity is not disclosed.
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heterogeneity is not salient, participants likely will discount the informativeness of such prior
perceptions of their ability for the subsequent contest as they cannot infer with certainty their
relative standing in the distribution of ability. In other words, compared to when the ability
heterogeneity is salient, participants are less likely to perceive that a stable “hierarchy of
performance” is formed (Kuhnen and Tymula 2012). Hence, all participants likely will be more
uncertain about the subsequent tournament’s outcome than when the level of ability heterogeneity
is high, but less uncertain than when the ability heterogeneity is low. Particularly, compared to
when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient all participants are less likely to feel the threat
from peers and attach less value to the tournament outcome. Compared to when the ability
heterogeneity is high and salient, however, to decrease the uncertainty of their tournament
outcomes, high performers are more likely to exert effort to preserve the current perceived position
while low performers are more likely to exert effort in an attempt to improve their standing as
winning remains possible. In sum, it is expected that when the ability heterogeneity is not salient,
RPI’s effectiveness is higher than when the heterogeneity is high and salient but lower than when
it is low and salient.
Besides the pecuniary effects discussed above, ability heterogeneity might simultaneously
affect the motivation of the participants through non-pecuniary channels. Compared to when
ability heterogeneity is not salient, tournaments may arouse additional emotions (e.g., joy, pride,
anger, etc.) when it is high and salient (Krakel 2008; Parco, Rapoport, and Amaldoss 2005;
Sheremeta 2010). Also, as social comparison is stronger when relative ability is made salient,
participants with a lower relative standing might increase effort to catch up in their ranking which
indicates status (Piazza and Castellucci 2014). Prior literature suggests that tournaments in
organizations often provide status competition and social recognition opportunities, as status is
11

often pursued as an end in itself and whose effect on monetary incentive is possibly substitutive
or complementary (Moldovanu et al. 2007; Piazza and Castellucci 2014; Frey 2007). Compared to
when ability heterogeneity is low and salient, the motivation based on emotions is lower when the
heterogeneity is high and salient. Prior literature suggests that while emotions motivate participants
when the ability difference is low, they both motivate and demotivate participants when the
difference is high but with a net motivating effect (Krakel 2008). 2 Therefore, when the
heterogeneity is high and salient compared to when it is not salient, participants might be
encouraged to increase effort due to evoked emotions and status-seeking intentions, while
simultaneously being discouraged by a low winning likelihood. Overall, explicitly pitting
participants against unequal peers might not be more discouraging than withholding information
of ability heterogeneity.
H2a: RPI’s effectiveness is higher when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient
than when it is not salient.
H2b (null): RPI’s effectiveness is not different when the ability heterogeneity is not
salient compared to when it is high and salient.
Even if participants rely on RPI to make effort choices for the subsequent contest, when
the ability heterogeneity is not salient, they might self-servingly interpret the heterogeneity level
based on past performance. As discussed above, I theorize that participants of different ability will
attribute their relative standing to different factors. In particular, high performers will likely
attribute their high ranks in the past to high ability. Therefore, compared to when the ability

2

The motivational effect provided by social comparison between Homogeneous and Heterogeneous condition is
discussed in the theory development of H1. Taken together, emotions and social comparison motivate participants
most in Homogeneous condition, and least in NotSalient condition.
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heterogeneity is low and salient, high performers are more likely to rely on a perceived advantage
in ability to save costly effort.
Similarly, low performers will likely attribute their low ranks in the past to low effort, to
maintain a positive self-image (Lazarus 1991; Smith 2000). In addition, due to a persistent bias of
overconfidence in relative ranking (Moore and Healy 2008; Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, and
Govorun 2001), low performers likely will maintain the expectation of winning in the subsequent
tournament insofar as the ability heterogeneity remains non-salient. Therefore, compared to high
performers, low performers are less likely to refrain from exerting effort as a persistent winning
expectation might drive them to do so. Thus, I predict that the low performers will experience a
smaller drop in performance than the high performers will when the ability heterogeneity turns
non-salient. Alternatively, the performance increase is more pronounced in the high performers
than in the low performers when the low level of ability heterogeneity becomes salient.
H3: Compared to when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient, the drop in RPI’s
effectiveness due to a non-salient knowledge of the ability heterogeneity, is lower among the
low performers than among the high performers.

3. Method
3.1 Overview
I use a between-subjects experimental design with three conditions: Homogeneous,
Heterogeneous, and NotSalient. In Homogeneous and Heterogeneous conditions, participants are
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made aware that they compete in a group of similar or different ability, respectively. In NotSalient
condition, participants are not informed of any ability information about the group.
The experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage, participants are randomly assigned
to groups of four members. Participants compete within-group for 8 minutes by performing a real
effort task – “the subtraction slider task”. The task is adapted from Chan (2018) and has been found
to enhance the effect of incentives on effort intensity (Choi, Clark, and Presslee 2018). During the
task, participants are shown a subtraction problem with a corresponding slider initially positioned
at 0 along a scrollbar from 0 to 100. The task is to first solve the subtraction problem without the
use of calculator or pencil and paper, and then to adjust the slider to the number position that
matches the answer to the problem. In each group, participants receive RPI as either “above
average” or “below average” based on relative individual performance.
In the second stage, participants are reshuffled and assigned to pairs where they perform
the same type of task for another 8 minutes. The manipulation of ability heterogeneity takes effect
in this stage. In Homogeneous condition, tournament is structured such that participants with the
same rank (i.e., low level of ability heterogeneity) from the first stage form a new group in the
second stage. In Heterogeneous condition, participants with different ranks (i.e., high level of
ability heterogeneity) from the first stage form a new group in the second stage. In both conditions,
ability heterogeneity is made salient by informing participants whether they are competing with
individuals of similar or different abilities in the second stage. In NotSalient condition, participants
of any ranks from the first stage form a new group in the second stage. Participants’ performance
is measured by the amount of output they produce, and output is measured by the total number of
sliders positioned correctly.

14

3.2 Design Choices
A few design choices warrant a discussion. First, participants receive a fixed pay rather
than a pay-for-performance incentive (e.g., a piece-rate compensation) in the first stage. This is
because a fixed pay, unlike any pay-for-performance incentives, does not introduce the wealth
effect across the stages.
Second, I choose to form groups of four rather than two in the first stage. Prior literature
suggests that individual ability needs not be constant such that the performance may be determined
as a process of a stochastic process – that is, in any single event, an underdog may be more able
than a favorite (Konrad and Kovenock 2010). The design choice was to convince the participants
that RPI accurately reflects their relative ability: in a larger group of four, RPI is associated more
with any difference in effort and/or ability than that in noise such as luck.
Third, to allow the full potency of RPI to be carried over into the second stage, I
dichotomize individuals between high and low performers, instead of giving specific ranks.
Providing specific ranks might lead to nonlinear perceptions of ability heterogeneity, which
introduces confounding effects in testing my theory. Also, the dichotomization represents a
conservative manipulation as it induces a weaker comparison of performance and thus works
against finding the results.
Lastly, I adopt a more conservative manipulation of NotSalient condition: giving
participants no information about ability heterogeneity. Participants might form some perceptions
of ability difference based on their experience in the first stage (i.e., I won/lost, so I’m very likely
of higher/lower ability in the next round), and presume those perceptions in the second stage. A
stronger manipulation for testing my theory would provide a clean slate of any perceived ability
15

difference in the second stage, such that participants, if pay any attention to ability heterogeneity,
fully consider the 50% chance of competing with a peer of similar ability. In addition, the current
manipulation more closely resembles the situation in the real world when companies are silent
about tournament structure.
3.3 Procedures
Before participating all participants read through and sign an informed consent form, in
accordance with IRB policy. Participants begin the experiment by reading the instructions for the
first stage via the computer program. Before proceeding to the tournament, participants take
attention-check quizzes and complete a practice round for 60 seconds to get familiar with the
subtraction slider task.
Participants are assigned to one of the three conditions based on which session they attend.
I run one condition per session and randomly determine which condition is used for each session.
All participants receive the same sets of problems in the same order to work on. In the first stage,
multiple problems need to be solved within a time limit of 8 minutes. After the first stage,
participants receive RPI: either “above average” or “below average” based on their rank with the
top two participants in a group above average and the bottom two in a group below average.3
After learning their rank for the first stage, participants are reshuffled into new groups
based on conditions. In Homogeneous condition, a participant is matched up with a new group
member who had an identical RPI in the initial group. In Heterogeneous condition, a participant

3

In the event of a tie for the second position, the computer randomly assigns the involved participants into different
positions. In the second stage, similarly, the computer randomly picks a winner and the prize is equally split. In the
sessions I ran, two pairs of participants tied in NotSalient condition and no ties occurred in the other conditions.
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is matched up with a new group member who had a different RPI than hers/his in the initial group.
In NotSalient condition, a participant is matched up with a new group member whose RPI in the
initial group is unknown. Participants read the instructions for the second stage before competing
for another 8 minutes of the same task. They receive similar feedback information as in the first
stage followed by a post-experimental questionnaire. They are paid in cash and dismissed.
3.4 Participants
Participants are recruited from the participant pool of an experimental economics
laboratory at a large U.S. public university. Participants are randomly assigned to conditions. All
participants receive a fixed reward of $5 by completing the tasks. The winner in each new group
in the second stage receives a prize of $10. The experiment is conducted entirely using the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher 2007). In total, 180 individuals participated in 7 sessions and formed 90
unique tournaments.4 Each session took approximately 60 minutes. Participants received a $5 fee,
in addition to the payoffs they earned during the experiment. Expected pay of each participant is
$15 on average across conditions. In NotSalient condition, high performers’ expected pay likely is
greater than $15 and low performers’ likely is less than $15. 5 This only affects and works against
finding results for H3.6

4

The size of each session ranges from 20 subjects to 36 subjects. I ran 2 sessions for both NotSalient and
Heterogeneous conditions, and 3 sessions for Homogeneous condition due to a limited lab availability before the
Thanksgiving Day.
5
By design, there is a 50% chance a low (high) performer will compete with a high (low) performer in Stage 2. Thus,
the low (high) performer’s chance of winning is likely lower (higher) than 50%. Ex post, though, low performers
reported directionally lower winning expectation (Performance Expectation in Stage2, as described in page 19. Midpoint vs. 3.56, p = 0.11, one-tailed and untabulated), and high performers reported higher winning expectation (5.6 vs.
Mid-point, p <0.01, one-tailed and untabulated).
6
In Homogeneous condition, expected pay is $15 for each participant. In Heterogeneous and NotSalient conditions,
due to the way Stage 2 is structured, high performers’ winning chance likely is higher and low performers’ is likely
lower. Hypothesis test for H1, H2a, and H2b are not affected since average expected pay is constant across conditions.
Related to H3, high (low) performers would have worked harder (less hard) in NotSalient than Homogeneous
condition with a higher (lower) expected pay, which is against the direction of my prediction.
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4. Results
4.1 Participants
Participants, on average, are 19.2 years old, 60.6 percent are female, and are all
undergraduate students. There are no significant differences across conditions for gender, age,
student status, GPA, country of origin, and undergraduate major (all p > 0.13). Participants earned
an average of $15.
4.2 Descriptive Results
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each condition. Notably, in Heterogenous
condition, the average level of RPI’s effectiveness is much greater than the other conditions (64.4%
versus either 3.5% or 17.5%). This is due to the large dispersion (standard deviation = 435.5%)
and the exceptionally high maximum (one participant had a 3400% increase in output).
In addition, 10 out of 60 participants reduced performance in Homogeneous condition,
while the number was 26 out of 60 in NotSalient condition and 29 out of 60 in Heterogeneous
condition.
4.3 Hypotheses Tests
H1 predicts that RPI’s effectiveness is higher when the level of ability heterogeneity is low
and salient compared to when the level is high and salient. Recall that individual performance is
measured by total output during each stage. To capture RPI’s effectiveness, I calculate the
difference in individual output between the stages, scaled by the output in Stage1 to control for
any individual characteristics related to task performance (i.e., RPI’s effectiveness = (output in
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Stage2-output in Stage1)/output in Stage1). To test H1, I compare RPI’s effectiveness between
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous condition. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, RPI’s effectiveness
was lower when participants have salient knowledge of a low level of ability heterogeneity (a 17.5%
increase in performance) than when participants have salient knowledge of a high level of ability
heterogeneity (a 64.4% increase in performance), which is inconsistent (t = -0.83, p = 0.41, twotailed) with H1.
Based on Tukey’s fences (Tukey 1977), four, three, and five participants are considered
outliers in NotSalient, Heterogeneous, and Homogeneous conditions, respectively. The
distribution of RPI’s effectiveness across conditions are statistically equal (all p-value of the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are greater than 0.37). I report additional results for all hypotheses tests
excluding the outliers.7 As shown in Panel B of Table 2, excluding the outliers, RPI’s effectiveness
was higher when the level of ability heterogeneity is high (a 13.8% increase in performance) than
when it is low (a 6.8% increase in performance), which is consistent (t = 1.69, p = 0.05, one-tailed)
with H1.
To better understand participants’ behavior, I examine their responses to a postexperimental question in which participants indicated, on a seven-point scale with endpoints of
“Very unlikely” (1) and “Very likely” (7), the extent to which they expected to win in Stage2
(Performance Expectation in Stage2). 8 Participants answered the same question for both
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous conditions in the post-experimental questionnaire. I define
participants as high (low) performers if their performance rank in Stage1 is above average (below

7

If excluding based on three standard deviations of the condition mean, 1, 2, and 0 participants are outliers in
NotSalient, Heterogenous, and Homogeneous conditions, respectively. Excluding those observations results in
significant support for H1 (p < 0.01) and H2a (p < 0.01). H2b is a null hypothesis and is supported after excluding the
outliers (p = 0.45, two-tailed). But, excluding the outliers results in an insignificant support for H3 (p = 0.16, twotailed).
8
The actual question was “At the beginning of Stage 2, I thought that winning was ___ in Stage 2.”
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average) among their peers in the same tournament group. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, high
performers in both conditions reported greater performance expectation in the second stage than
low performers (Homogeneous, 4.57 v. 3.30, t = 2.60, p = 0.01, two-tailed; Heterogeneous, 5.27
v. 2.83, t = 5.24, p < 0.001, one-tailed). Between the conditions, high performers reported greater
performance expectation in Heterogeneous than in Homogeneous condition (5.27 v. 4.57, t = 1.67,
p = 0.05, one-tailed and untabulated), while low performers reported directionally greater
performance expectation in Homogeneous than in Heterogeneous condition (3.30 v. 2.83, t = 0.88,
p = 0.19, one-tailed and untabulated). The results suggest that while high performers have greater
performance expectation in the second stage compared to low performers regardless of ability
heterogeneity knowledge, the difference in the expectation between high and low performers is
moderated by such knowledge. This partially supports the underlying theory that the level of ability
heterogeneity influenced participants’ performance expectations upon receiving RPI. Excluding
the outliers does not change the significance. Overall, the results support H1.
H2 predicts that RPI’s effectiveness is higher when the ability heterogeneity is not salient
than when it is high and salient, but not different than when it is low and salient. To test H2a, I
compare RPI’s effectiveness across all conditions. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, RPI’s
effectiveness is greater in Homogeneous (a 17.5% increase in performance) than in NotSalient
condition (a 3.5% increase in performance), which is consistent (F = 7.05, p < 0.01) with H2a.
With the outliers, RPI’s effectiveness is directionally greater in Heterogeneous than in NotSalient
condition (64.4% vs. 3.5%). But the difference is not statistically significant (F = 1.15, p = 0.29),
which is consistent with H2b.
After excluding the outliers, the comparison between Homogeneous and NotSalient
condition remains significant (F = 12.60, p < 0.01) and is consistent with H2a. The difference
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between Heterogeneous and NotSalient condition remains insignificant (F = 2.40, p = 0.12) with
a smaller magnitude (from 60.9% to 6.6%).
To test the underlying logic of H2a and H2b, I examine participants’ responses to a postexperimental question in which they indicated the extent to which they believed that the peer was
of similar task-related ability in Stage2 (Perceived Heterogeneity) on a seven-point scale with
endpoints of “Disagree” (1) and “Agree” (7) 9 . Inconsistent with the argument behind H2, the
results indicate that participants in NotSalient condition believed that they were competing in
somewhat homogeneous tournaments (mean = 5.10, compared with the midpoint, t = 4.63, p <
0.01, two-tailed and untabulated). This inconsistency might be attributable to the high self-efficacy
of the participants in NotSalient condition (mean = 4.93, compared with the midpoint, t = 5.16, p
< 0.01, two-tailed and untabulated) 10 . Prior studies suggest high self-efficacy leads to low
acceptance of feedback (Nease, Mudgett, and Quinones 1999). It is possible that the participants
tried to justify their performance by reporting a high perceived homogeneity in order to maintain
the self-image.
To further explore whether Perceived Heterogeneity explains the relationship between the
conditions (Homogeneous vs. NotSalient) and RPI’s effectiveness, I examine a mediation model
using the full sample based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) process. The results support a mediation.
Besides the direct effect (F = 7.05, p<0.01 two-tailed), the conditions are significantly associated
with Perceived Heterogeneity (t = 8.01, p<0.01 two-tailed and untabulated), and Perceived
Heterogeneity explains RPI’s effectiveness (t = 1.94, p = 0.05 two-tailed and untabulated) while
reducing the impact of the conditions on RPI’s effectiveness (coefficient decreases from 0.14 to
0.07). The results suggest the perception of more heterogeneous tournaments in NotSalient

9

The actual question was “In Stage 2, I was competing in a group of similar ability in solving the task.”
The measurement of participants’ self-efficacy is discussed in section 4.4.4.

10

21

condition can be the underlying reason that RPI is less effective compared to Homogeneous
condition.
Overall, the results support H2a: RPI’s effectiveness is lower when the ability
heterogeneity is not salient than when it is low and salient. The prediction regarding
Heterogeneous condition being not different than NotSalient condition is also supported.11
As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1, H3 predicts that the drop in RPI’s effectiveness
between Homogeneous and NotSalient condition, is lower among the low performers than among
the high performers. To test H3, I analyze the interaction term of a two-way ANOVA between RPI
(1=above average, 0=below average) and Condition (1=Homogeneous, 0=NotSalient) on RPI’s
effectiveness. Inconsistent (Condition*RPI, F = 1.78, p = 0.19) with my prediction, as shown in
Panel A of Table 4, there is no significant crossover interaction of Condition and Stage1 Rank.
After excluding the outliers, however, the interaction term becomes significant (F = 4.27, p = 0.04).
This suggests that the drop in RPI’s effectiveness from Homogeneous to NotSalient condition
depends on whether the participants are high performers. The result is significant in supporting
H3.
To better understand participants’ behavior, I compare their Performance Expectation in
Stage2 with their performance expectation in Stage112. Low performers in NotSalient condition
reported similar performance expectation in both stages (3.70 v. 3.57, t = -0.28, p = 0.78, twotailed and untabulated). This suggests that low performers maintain their performance expectation

11

In NotSalilent condition, low (high) performers’ Performance Expectation in Stage2 are insignificantly
(significantly) different from the midpoint (mean = 3.57 and 5.60, t = 1.21 and 5.94, p = 0.23 and <0.01, two-tailed
and untabulated). The results are partially consistent with my argument that participants discount prior knowledge of
their ability.
12
I examine their responses to a question answered before they receive the ranks in the first stage, in which participants
indicated, on a seven-point scale with endpoints of “Very unlikely” (1) and “Very likely” (7), the extent to which they
expected to win in Stage1 (Performance Expectation in Stage1). The actual question was “I think that winning was
___ in Stage 1.”
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in Stage2, which, as discussed above, might discourage effort reduction. Also, high performers
increased their winning expectation from Stage1 to Stage2 (4.70 v. 5.60, t = 2.25, p = 0.03, twotailed and untabulated). Consistent with my argument, the higher winning expectation might result
in high performers saving effort in Stage2. In comparison, in Homogeneous condition, both low
and high performers had similar performance expectation between the stages (3.00 v. 3.30 and
4.30 v. 4.57, t = -0.63 and -0.63, p = 0.53 and 0.53, respectively, two-tailed and untabulated).
Overall, the results support the underlying theory for H3.
4.4 Supplemental Analysis
4.4.1 Utilities and Disutilties Associated with Tournament Outcomes
In predicting H1, I argue that participants associate nonpecuniary value of winning and
losing in Stage2, which vary depending on the level of ability heterogeneity. A participant’s focus
on either winning or avoiding losing is largely driven by the type of his/her achievement goal.
According to achievement goal theory (Elliot and McGregor 2001), individuals situationally
pursue two types of goals in competitions: promotional and preventional. In this paper’s setting, it
is not clear ex ante whether a participant, be the individual a high or low performer, would focus
more on any particular achievement goal. 13 Testing participants’ achievement goals helps
determine whether their nonpecuniary value of tournament outcomes is related to the utility or
disutility of the outcomes. Therefore, I examine their responses to a set of three post-experimental
questions: the first question is to measure a participant’s achievement goal, and the second and

13

For example, a higher performer may want to win as many times as possible and a low performer may want to win
at least once (a maximizer). Alternatively, a high performer may care more about not losing the winner status and a
low performer may focus on not losing twice in a row (a satisfier).
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third questions are to measure the level of the utilities and disutilities associated with tournament
outcomes.
Specifically, in response to the first post-experimental question, participants indicated the
extent to which they focused more on winning or on avoiding losing the tournament (Achievement
Goal) on a seven-point scale with endpoints of “Do better than the other participant” (1) and
“Avoid doing poorly in the new group” (7).14 Next, to capture participants’ utilities associated with
tournament outcomes, following Krakel (2008) and Moldovanu et al. (2007), I examine
participants’ responses to a post-experimental question in which they indicated the extent to which
they feel positive emotions and/or status recognition about winning the tournament (Utility) on a
seven-point scale with endpoints of “Not at all” (1) and “To a great degree” (7).15 Lastly, to capture
participants’ disutilities associated with tournament outcomes, I examine participants’ responses
to a post-experimental question in which they indicated the extent to which they feel negative
emotions and/or status recognition about losing the tournament (Disutility) on a seven-point scale
with endpoints of “Not at all” (1) and “To a great degree” (7).16 Utility of Ranks is a participant’s
perceived value of tournament outcomes conditional on his/her Achievement Goal. It equals the
participant’s reported Utility (Disutility) if Achievement Goal > 4 (< 4). In cases where
Achievement Goal = 4, Utility of Ranks equals the greater response between Utility and Disutility.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, high performers’ Utility of Ranks was similar between
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous condition (the means are 4.77 and 5.07, respectively; t = -0.59,
p = 0.55, two-tailed); low performers’ Utility of Ranks was directionally higher in Homogeneous

14

The actual questions were “In Stage 2, did you want to do better than the other participant, or want to avoid doing
poorly in the new group? (Adapted from Elliot and McGregor 2001)”
15
The actual question was “To what degree do you think that winning in Stage 2 would make you feel proud, happy,
or fulfilled?”
16
The actual question was “To what degree do you think that winning in Stage 2 would make you feel proud, happy,
or fulfilled?”
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than in Heterogeneous condition (the means are 5.67 and 5.30, respectively; t = 0.92, p = 0.18,
one-tailed).
To further explore participants’ Achievement Goal, I test a mediation model based on
Hayes (2009) process. I examine whether the impact of the conditions (Homogeneous vs.
Heterogeneous) on RPI’s effectiveness is mediated by Achievement Goal. Using the full sample,
the mediating effect is possible. The association between the conditions and Achievement Goal is
significant (t = -1.65, p = 0.10 two-tailed and untabulated), Achievement Goal reduces the impact
between the conditions and RPI’s effectiveness (from 0.107 to 0.102) while being insignificantly
associated with RPI’s effectiveness (t = -0.67, p = 0.50 two-tailed and untabulated). This suggests
that participants in Homogeneous condition focus more on winning than avoiding losing compared
to those in NotSalient condition, which might lead to greater performance after receiving RPI.
To support H2a, similarly, participants’ responses to the same post-experimental questions
indicate that the difference between the value attached to the tournament outcomes in
Homogeneous and NotSalient conditions is consistent with my theory among low performers (the
means are 5.66 and 4.53, respectively; t = 2.39, p = 0.01, one-tailed and untabulated). In high
performers, however, the difference is not significant (the means are 4.77 and 5.13, respectively; t
= -0.74, p = 0.46 two-tailed and untabulated).
In H2b, I argue that the emotions and status-seeking intention aroused by the ability
information may encourage spending effort in Heterogeneous condition compared to NotSalient
condition, offsetting effort reduction associated with more pecuniary driving forces such as
winning expectancy. Partially consistent with my argument, low performers reported marginally
stronger Utility of Ranks (5.30 v. 4.53, t = 1.51, p = 0.07, one-tailed and untabulated) and high
performers reported similar Utility of Ranks (5.07 v. 5.13, t = -0.14, p = 0.89, two-tailed and

25

untabulated) in Heterogeneous than NotSalient condition. This suggests the low performers in
Heterogeneous condition were likely more motivated by non-pecuniary factors than in NotSalient
condition.
4.4.2 Attribution
To better understand the result of H3, I examine participants’ responses to a post-experimental
question in which they indicated the extent to which they attributed Stage1 rank to individual
differences in effort level or task ability (Attribution) on a seven-point scale with endpoints of
“Entirely due to differences in individual effort levels” (1) and “Entirely due to differences in
individual abilities” (7). The results indicate that, as shown in Panel B of Table 4, high performers
attributed their above-average performance in Stage1 to ability (4.93), which is consistent (t = 3.56,
p < 0.01, one-tailed) with part of my theory behind H3. Low performers equally (4.03) attributed
their below-average performance to both effort and ability (t = -0.11, p = 0.91, two-tailed), which
does not follow part of my theory behind H3.
4.4.3 Task Attitude
The advanced slider task is meant to test individual behavior generalizable to real corporate
tournament settings where intellectual ability is important for career success. To test whether the
task speaks to their intellectual ability, I examine their responses to a post-experimental question
in which they indicated the extent to which they agreed both intellectual ability and effort are
important in doing the advanced slider task (Task Attitude) on a seven-point scale with endpoints
of “Not at all” (1) and “To a great degree” (7)17. Further, before the 60-second practice session, I
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The actual question was “To what extent you agree with this statement: In order to solve accurately and quickly the
type of subtraction problems given here, one is required to exert effort and possess intellectual ability.”
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examine their responses to a pre-experimental question in which they indicated the extent to which
they thought intellectual ability is important for succeeding in life (PreAttitude) on a seven-point
scale with endpoints of “Not at all” (1) and “To a great degree” (7).18 The results indicate that
participants in all conditions value intellectual ability in general (the means are 5.67, 5.5, 5.65,
respectively in Homogeneous, NotSalient, and Heterogeneous conditions, compared to the midpoint, all t > 8.25, all p < 0.01, two-tailed and untabulated). Also, they thought intellectual ability
was important for performing well in the task in this experiment (the means are 5.13, 5.12, 5.00,
respectively in Homogeneous, NotSalient, and Heterogeneous conditions, compared to the midpoint, all t > 6.01, all p < 0.01, two-tailed and untabulated). In tandem, the reported PreAttitude
and Task Attitude suggest that participants thought their performance in the task reflected their
intellectual ability which they believe is important in real life.
4.4.4 Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Efficacy
Both intrinsic motivation and perceived competence (self-efficacy) can potentially affect
task performance and make the results discussed above less representative: individuals who are
intrinsically motivated to do the task, or with higher self-efficacy, might persistently work hard
regardless of feedback or relative ability information. Specifically, prior literature finds that
professional athletes do not reduce effort on lagging performance or on inferior ability in
tournaments. This is because the productivity of intrinsically motivated individuals is not
dependent on social spillovers, whether positive or negative (Guryan et al. 2009). 19 Also,
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The actual question was “To what degree do you think that intellectual ability is important for succeeding in life?”
Different from professional athletes who invest in human capital over the course of their life, regular employees
arguably are mostly motivated by extrinsic rewards. For instance, in contrast, prior studies using work-like tasks or
subjects with regular jobs find peer effects (e.g., Mas and Moretti 2009; Falk and Ichino 2006; Bandiera et al. 2009).
Therefore, individuals with high intrinsic motivation are considered less relevant to the context of this paper which is
employee tournaments in a regular corporate environment.
19
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individuals with high self-efficacy are less likely to accept feedback (Nease et al. 1999) and more
likely to maintain or even increase effort in the face of setbacks (Bandura 1997).
To examine whether the results are affected by their intrinsic motivation in the task, I
measure participants’ responses to a pre-experimental question in which they indicated the extent
to which they enjoyed doing math problems (Intrinsic) on a seven-point scale with endpoints of
“Not at all” (1) and “To a great degree” (7).20 The results indicate that participants in Homogeneous
and Heterogeneous conditions were neutral toward the task (the means are 4.00, 4.05, respectively,
compared to the mid-point, t = 0.00 and 0.22, p = 1.00 and 0.82, two-tailed and untabulated). In
NotSalient condition, participants’ intrinsic motivation was moderately higher than normal (mean
= 4.42, compared to the mid-point, t = 1.86, p = 0.07, two-tailed and untabulated). This indicates
participants in NotSalient condition might be motivated to maintain effort in the second stage.
However, controlling for Intrinsic as a covariate does not change the significance of the main
results.
Similarly, to examine whether the results are affected by their self-efficacy in the task, I
measure participants’ responses to a pre-experimental question in which they indicated the extent
to which they were able to solve math problems compared to other participants (Self-Efficacy) on
a seven-point scale with endpoints of “Worse than others” (1) and “Better than others” (7).21 The
results indicate that participants in Homogeneous condition perceived neutral relative competence
in the task (mean = 4.25, compared to the mid-point, t = 1.27, p = 0.21, two-tailed and untabulated).
In NotSalient and Heterogeneous conditions, participants perceived high relative competence
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The actual question was “How much do you think you will enjoy doing the math problems?” The responses were
collected before the 60-second practice session.
21
The actual question was “How well do you think you will do on the math task compared to the other participants in
the session?” The responses were collected before the 60-second practice session.
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(mean = 4.93 and 4.52, respectively, compared to the mid-point, t = 5.16 and 2.82, all p < 0.01,
two-tailed and untabulated). This indicates self-efficacy might drive the results as a covariate.
However, controlling for Self-Efficacy as a covariate does not change the significance of the main
results of H1, H2, or H3.
Overall, although some participants reported a greater intrinsic motivation or higher selfefficacy, the test results are not significantly affected.
5. Conclusions
I investigate the effects of providing tournament participants with ability heterogeneity
information on the effectiveness of relative performance information (RPI). In my experimental
setting, the first stage is used to sort out participants’ task abilities while the second stage is the
tournament that determines the winners. I focus on the effectiveness of RPI provided between the
stages. I find that when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient, the performance expectation
between high and low performers are closer, resulting in greater performance upon learning the
tournament structure. I also find that compared with when the ability heterogeneity is not salient,
when the ability heterogeneity is high and salient, RPI’s effectiveness is not less negative as
winning becomes more necessary or appealing for the low performers. In addition, I find that
compared with when the ability heterogeneity is low and salient, when the ability heterogeneity is
not salient, high performers are more prone to reducing effort.
My study has several implications. First, the results of my study demonstrate the interrelated nature of tournament structure and information system design choices in designing
effective tournaments. The findings extend prior research (Newman and Tafkov 2014) that shows
that the negative effect of providing RPI in tournaments, as documented by Hannan et al. (2008),
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is not universal to all tournament structures. Second, by showing that the effectiveness of RPI
varies based on the level and salience of tournament participants’ ability heterogeneity, I highlight
that firms need to be conscious about any difference among the employees when RPI is present.
Specifically, my results suggest that firms will benefit from emphasizing information about the
level of ability heterogeneity to the employees under a homogeneous tournament. The benefit is
greater when emphasizing among the more productive employees. Also, if employees can learn
RPI via informal sources (Hannan et al. 2013), it is not necessarily the case that firms need to
discontinue the tournaments to avoid negative performance effects if the informal information
suggests more homogeneous tournaments.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of Performance and RPI’s Effectiveness

22

Stage-1
Output

Stage-2
Output

RPI's
Effectiveness22

25% RPI's
Effectiveness

75% RPI's
Effectiveness

Minimum
RPI’s
Effectiveness

NotSalient
(n=60)

27.9
(14.2)

28.1
(14.1)

3.5%
(29.7%)

-13.7%

15.4%

-66.7%

110.0%

Heterogeneous
(n=60)

28.3
(12.4)

29.7
(10.9)

64.4%
(435.5%)

-9.3%

24.5%

-81.3%

3400.0%

Homogeneous
(n=60)

29.8
(13.4)

34.2
(14.0)

17.5%
(27.5%)

0.0%

30.9%

-57.1%

95.7%

RPI’s effectiveness is the difference of individual output between Stage2 and Stage1, scaled by Stage1 output.
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Maximum
RPI’s
Effectiveness

TABLE 2
RPI's Effectiveness When Ability Heterogeneity Is Salient (H1)
Panel A: Full Sample

RPI's effectiveness

Homogeneous
[n = 60]

Heterogeneous
[n = 60]

17.5%
(0.27)

64.4%
(4.35)

(t-test)
Diff. = -46.9%
(t = -0.83, p = 0.41)

Homogeneous

Performance Expectation
in Stage2

High
Performers
[n = 30]

Low
Performers
[n = 30]

(t-test)

4.57
(1.67)

3.30
(2.12)

Diff. = 1.27
(t = 2.60, p = 0.01)

Heterogeneous

Performance Expectation
in Stage2

High
Performers
[n = 30]

Low
Performers
[n = 30]

(t-test)

5.27
(1.53)

2.83
(1.92)

Diff. = 2.00
(t = 5.24, p < 0.01)

High Performers
Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
[n = 30]
[n = 30]
Utility of Ranks23

4.77
(0.74)

5.07
(0.99)

Low Performers
Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
[n = 30]
[n = 30]
Utility of Ranks

23

5.67
(1.01)

5.30
(1.17)

(t-test)
Diff. = -0.30
(t = -0.59, p = 0.55)

(t-test)
Diff. = 0.37
(t = 0.92, p = 0.18)

Utility of Ranks is the reported Utility or Disutility conditional on participants’ Achievement Goal.
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Panel B: Excluding Outliers

RPI's effectiveness

Homogeneous
[n = 55]

Heterogeneous
[n = 57]

13.8%
(0.19)

6.8%
(0.24)

(t-test)
Diff. = 7.0%
(t = 1.69, p = 0.05)

Homogeneous

Performance Expectation
in Stage2

High
Performers
[n = 30]

Low
Performers
[n = 25]

(t-test)

4.57
(1.67)

3.04
(1.99)

Diff. = 1.53
(t = 3.01, p < 0.01)

Heterogeneous

Performance Expectation
in Stage2

High
Performers
[n = 30]

Low
Performers
[n = 27]

(t-test)

5.27
(1.53)

2.75
(1.79)

Diff. = 2.52
(t = 5.40, p < 0.01)

High Performers
Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
[n = 30]
[n = 30]
Utility of Ranks

4.77
(0.74)

5.07
(0.99)

Low Performers
Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
[n = 25]
[n = 27]
Utility of Ranks

5.72
(1.34)

5.19
(1.68)
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(t-test)
Diff. = -0.30
(t = -0.59, p = 0.55)

(t-test)
Diff. = 0.53
(t = 1.25, p = 0.11)

TABLE 3
RPI's Effectiveness Depending on the Salience of Ability Heterogeneity (H2a and H2b)

Panel A: Full Sample

RPI's effectiveness

RPI's effectiveness

Homogeneous
[n = 60]

NotSalient
[n = 60]

(ANOVA)

17.5%
(0.27)

3.5%
(0.30)

Diff. = 13.9%
(F = 7.05, p < 0.01)

Heterogeneous
[n = 60]

NotSalient
[n = 60]

(ANOVA)

64.4%
(4.35)

3.5%
(0.30)

Diff. = 60.9%
(F = 1.15, p = 0.29)

Homogeneous
[n = 55]

NotSalient
[n = 56]

(ANOVA)

13.8%
(0.19)

0.2%
(0.21)

Diff. = 13.6%
(F = 12.6, p < 0.01)

Heterogeneous
[n = 57]

NotSalient
[n = 56]

(ANOVA)

6.8%
(0.24)

0.2%
(0.21)

Diff. = 6.6%
(F = 2.40, p = 0.12)

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

RPI's effectiveness

RPI's effectiveness
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TABLE 4
Drop in RPI’s Effectiveness (H3)

Panel A: Two-Way ANOVA, Full Sample
Source

DF

Type III SS

Mean Square

F Value

Pr > F

Condition

1

0.5869

0.5869

7.57

0.0069

Stage1 Rank

1

0.6916

0.6916

8.92

0.0034

Condition*Stage1 Rank

1

0.1377

0.1377

1.78

0.1851

DF

Type III SS

Mean Square

F Value

Pr > F

Condition

1

0.4719

0.4719

12.41

0.0006

Stage1 Rank

1

0.2159

0.2159

5.68

0.0189

Condition*Stage1 Rank

1

0.1625

0.1625

4.27

0.0412

Two-Way ANOVA, Excluding Outliers
Source

Panel B: NotSalient, Full Sample

Attribution

High
Performers
[n = 30]

(t test)

Low
Performers
[n = 30]

(t test)

4.93
(1.41)

Diff. = 0.93
(t = 3.56, p < 0.01)

4.03
(1.58)

Diff. = 0.03
(t = -0.11, p = 0.91)

High
Performers
[n = 30]

(t test)

Low
Performers
[n = 26]

(t test)

4.93
(1.41)

Diff. = 0.93
(t = 3.56, p < 0.01)

4.15
(1.59)

Diff. = 0.15
(t = 0.49, p = 0.63)

NotSalient, Excluding Outliers

Attribution
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FIGURE 1
Drop in RPI’s Effectiveness (H3)

RPI's Effectiveness

Panel A: Predicted

Homogeneous
NotSalient

High

Low

Panel B: Results
20.0%

RPI's Effectiveness

15.0%

14.4%

13.3%

10.0%
9.0%
5.0%

Homogeneous
NotSalient

0.0%
-5.0%
-10.0%

-7.5%
HIGH

LOW
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Instructions
General
Welcome!
You are about to participate in a study on problem solving. Please read the instructions carefully.
You need to understand these instructions to make money today. In total, this session should last
no longer than 75 minutes.
No one will be able to associate your responses in today’s study with you personally. Responses
will only be attributable to your unique participation ID. You chose your ID by selecting where
you sat in the room. As such, there is no way to associate your name with a particular participation
ID.
You are prohibited from using a cell phone, a pen / pencil, paper, calculator, or any other outside
materials during this session.
If you have any questions at any time during today’s session, please raise your hand. The
administrator will answer your question in private. Please do not communicate with anyone other
than the administrator after this point.

Overview of the Study
This study consists of two stages. Your task is to solve a series of problems in each stage.
You will earn income in an experimental currency called Lira. At the conclusion of today’s session,
the Lira you earn will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for 60 Lira. Therefore, the more
Lira you earn, the more money you will earn. The amount of money you earn will be paid out in
cash at the end of the session.
Stage 1
At the beginning of Stage 1, you will be randomly matched with three other participants to form
an initial group of four (4). You will not learn the identity of the other members of your group and
they will not learn your identity.
In Stage 1, your task is to solve a series of problems. The computer screen will display one problem
at a time. After solving the current problem, you must click the “SUBMIT” button, to work
on the next problem.
Stage 1 will last 480 seconds (8 minutes). To help you keep track of your time, a clock is displayed
on all screens during the stage. The clock counts down from 480 seconds (8 minutes) and starts at
the beginning of the stage.
All participants will work on the exact same set of problems in the exact same order.
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Task Description (Stage 1)
In this stage, you will perform a ‘math slider task.’ The computer screen will display a few sliders
along with some subtraction problems, with each slider initially positioned at 0 along a scrollbar
from 0 to 100. Your task is to first solve a subtraction problem and then adjust the slider to
the number position that matches your answer to the problem.
Below is a screenshot sample of the task.

In this sample task, for instance, a subtraction problem of ’67-32=’ is displayed to the left of the
scrollbar. The number displayed to the right of the scrollbar indicates the current number position
of the slider, which changes as you move the slider.
To complete the task, you need to first solve in your head the subtraction problem. Assume your
solution to the problem is 67-32=35, you must then drag the slider from the initial position of 0 to
the position of 35 using your computer mouse.
Math problems are often used in standardized tests administered for determining college
and graduate school entrance. In order to solve accurately and quickly the type of subtraction
problems given here, one is required to exert effort and possess intellectual ability.
[Question A1, A2, and A3 about here.]
Practice Period
You will start with a practice period. The practice period will allow you to become familiar with the
subtraction problems and the program. You will NOT be paid for the practice round.
You will have 60 seconds to perform this task. A timer will show in the top right hand corner of the screen.
Please click the 'START TASK' button to begin the task.

Compensation (Stage 1)
You will earn 150 Lira for completing the task. Your performance in this stage may affect some
aspects of the next stage.
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Feedback (Stage 1)
At the end of the stage, you will learn how many problems you solved correctly in Stage 1.
In addition, at the end of Stage 1, you will also learn whether your performance (number of
correctly solved subtraction problems) was BETTER or WORSE than at least two members
in your group. Specifically, a message will appear on the computer screen which ranks
(Above Average or Below Average) your performance among the four participants in your
group.

Quiz 1
Before we move on, you need to answer ALL the following questions correctly. If you encounter
difficulties in answering questions, please raise your hand and a facilitator will assist you.
1. To correctly solve a problem, you must both find the right answer and move the slider to the
right position.
True
False
2. Your rank reflects your performance compared to at least two other participants on your group.
True
False
3. You are matched with three other participants to form an initial group of four in Stage 1.
True
False
4. Participants will work on different sets of problems in Stage 1.
True
False
5. You earn 150 Lira for completing the task.
True
False

(Transition)
You have correctly answered all the questions in Quiz 1. The actual task (Stage 1) is about to start.

Stage 2
(Homogeneous Condition) In this new stage, you will be assigned to a NEW group of TWO
participants. Importantly, the other participant in your new group had the same rank as yours
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in Stage 1. That is, for example, if your performance rank was Above Average in Stage 1, the
other participant assigned to your group also had performance rank Above Average in Stage 1. If
your performance rank was Below Average in Stage 1, the other participant assigned to your group
also had performance rank Below Average in Stage 1.
You will not learn the identity of the other member of your group and he/she will not learn your
identity.
(Heterogeneous Condition) In this new stage, you will be assigned to a NEW group of TWO
participants. Importantly, the participant in your new group had a different rank than yours
in Stage 1. That is, for example, if your performance rank was Above Average in Stage 1, the
other participant assigned to your group had performance rank Below Average in Stage 1. If your
performance rank was Below Average in Stage 1, the other participant assigned to your group had
performance rank Above Average in Stage 1.
You will not learn the identity of the other member of your group and he/she will not learn your
identity.
(Non-Salient Condition) In this new stage, you will be assigned to a NEW group of TWO
participants.
You will not learn the identity of the other member of your group and he/she will not learn your
identity.
Task Description (Stage 2)
After being assigned to your new group, once again you will perform the math slider task for 480
seconds (8 minutes). To help you keep track of your time, a clock is displayed on all screens during
the stage. The clock counts down from 480 seconds (8 minutes) and starts at the beginning of the
stage.
All participants will work on the exact same NEW set of problems in the exact same order. The
difficulty level of the new problems remains the same as in the previous stage.

Feedback (Stage 2)
By the end of the stage, you will also learn how many problems you solved correctly in Stage 2.
In addition, a message will appear on the computer screen which shows your relative
performance in Stage 2 among the two participants in your new group (Won or Lost).
Compensation (Stage 2)
Your output in the previous stage does not count towards your output in this stage. Recall
that you have already earned 150 Lira for completing the previous stage. In this stage, each
participant receives a salary of 150 Lira for completing the task regardless of accuracy. Moreover,
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the Winner of each new group in Stage 2 will receive a bonus of 600 Lira. In the event of a tie,
the bonus amount will be split between both participants.
At the end of the session, the Lira from both stages will be added together to determine the total
Lira that you earned. The amount will be converted to dollars and the resulting amount will be
paid to you in cash at the end of today’s session.

Quiz 2
Before we move on, you need to answer ALL the following questions correctly. If you encounter
difficulties in answering questions, please raise your hand and a facilitator will assist you.

1. (Homogeneous condition) The other participant in your new group had the same performance
rank as yours in Stage 1.
True
False
(Heterogeneous condition) The other participant in your new group had a different performance
rank as yours in Stage 1.
True
False
2. If a participant’s rank were Above Average in Stage 1 and Last in Stage 2, he/she will receive a
bonus of 600 Lira on top of the salary.
True
False
3. If a participant’s rank were Below Average in Stage 1 and First in Stage 2, he/she will receive
a bonus of 600 Lira on top of the salary.
True
False
4. You are paired with another participant to form a new group of two in Stage 2.
True
False
5. Participants will work on the exact same NEW set of problems in the exact same order in Stage
2.
True
False
(Transition)
You have correctly answered all the questions in Quiz 2. The actual task (Stage 2) is about to start.
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The following instruments will be displayed on the subjects’ screens during the actual tasks.
Task – Stage 1
You will now begin Stage 1. You will have 480 seconds (8 minutes) to perform the math slider
task during Stage 1.
At the end of the 480 seconds (8 minutes), you will learn the number of problems correctly
solved and your rank.
You are assigned to a group of four (4) participants.
Please click the 'START TASK' button to begin the task.
[Question B about here]

Feedback – Stage 1
The number of problems you correctly solved in Stage 1:_____.
Your rank in Stage 1: (Above Average / Below Average).
Task – Stage 2
You will now begin Stage 2. You will have 480 seconds (8 minutes) to perform the math slider
task during Stage 2. At the end of the 480 seconds (8 minutes), you will learn the number of
problems correctly solved and your rank.
You are assigned to a new group of two (2) participants.
(Homogeneous/Heterogeneous condition)
Your performance in Stage 1 was (Above Average / Below Average).
The other member on the new group was (Above Average / Below Average) in his/her initial
group in Stage 1.
Please click the 'START TASK' button to begin the task.
(Non-Salient condition)
Your performance in Stage 1 was (Above Average / Below Average).
Please click the 'START TASK' button to begin the task.

Feedback – Stage 2
You correctly solved _____ problems in Stage 2.
You (Won/Lost) in Stage 2.
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Pre-Experimental Questionnaires
A1. (To be collected before the practice round) Construct: intrinsic motivation
How much do you think you will enjoy doing the math problems?
1

2

3

4

Not at all

5

6

7

Somewhat

Very much

A2. (To be collected before the practice round) Construct: Self-efficacy
How well do you think you will do on the math task compared to the other participants in the
session?
1

2

3

4

Worse
than others

5

6

About the same
as others

7
Better
than others

A3. Construct: PreAttitude
To what degree do you think that intellectual ability is important for succeeding in life?
1

2

3

Not at all

4

5

6

To a moderate
degree

7
To a great
degree

B. (To be collected before participants receive their rank in Stage 1) Construct:
performance expectation in Stage 1
I think that winning was ___ in Stage 1.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very Unlikely

7
Very Likely

Post-Experimental Questionnaires
NS1. Non-Salient condition. Construct: perceived ability heterogeneity
In Stage 2, I was competing in a group of similar ability in solving the task.
1

2

3

4

Disagree

5

6

7
Agree

50

1./NS2. Construct: performance expectation in Stage 2
At the beginning of Stage 2, I thought that winning was ______.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very Unlikely

7
Very Likely

NS3. Non-Salient Condition. Construct: attribution
Do you think that your rank in Stage 1 (being either Above Average or Below Average) was due
more to differences in individual effort levels or more to differences in individual abilities?
1

2

3

Entirely due to
differences in
individual effort levels

4

5

6

Equally due to
differences in
effort and ability

7
Entirely due to
differences in
individual abilities

2./NS4. Construct: achievement goal
In Stage 2, did you want to do better than the other participant, or want to avoid doing poorly in
the new group? (Adapted from Elliot and McGregor 2001)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Do better
than the other
participant

7
Avoid doing poorly
in the new group

3./NS5. Construct: Utility
To what degree do you think that winning in Stage 2 would make you feel proud, happy, or
fulfilled?
1

2
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To a great
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4./NS6. Construct: Disutility
To what degree do you think that losing in Stage 2 would make you feel ashamed, upset, or
unfulfilled?
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Not at all
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5./NS7. Construct: attitude toward the math slider task
To what extent you agree with this statement: In order to solve accurately and quickly the type of
subtraction problems given here, one is required to exert effort and possess intellectual ability.
1

2

3

Not at all
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Demographic Questions
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your education level?
4. What is your major?
5. What is your GPA?
6. What country are you originally from?
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